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Abstract 
Due to difficulties associated with measuring expectations and observing random coordination devices, 
the models that posit the idea that business cycles being driven by expectations are hard to test 
empirically. The paper proposes an experiment to capture features of an expectation driven business 
cycles model and investigate whether such cycles arise in an experimental setting. Externalities, 
uncertainty and an extrinsic random variable to mimic the crucial features of the model are introduced. 
The results provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that given the right incentives for 
coordination, expectations-driven cycles do occur. 
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Introduction  
Since the economic crisis of 2008 and the 
subsequent world economic recession, there is a 
renewed interest in the Schumpeterian theory of 
business cycles. In particular, a great emphasis 
is made on the nature and causes of business 
cycles. However, few subjects in economics are 
as contentious as the business cycles-the 
fluctuations of output and unemployment 
around the long run upward trend (Sloman, 
2003). A generation ago, majority of 
economists agreed on what caused business 
cycles. Then, partly as a result of "stagflation" -
the unexpected and unpleasant combination of 
inflation and unemployment- economists 
studying business cycles divided into rival 
factions (Krugman, 2010).  
 
The dominant view in this regard until recently 
was that Business Cycles are the result of 
exogenous shocks to the fundamental 
conditions of a dynamically stable economic 
system (Lucas, 1975).According to this view, 
the fluctuations in the economy, recessions and 
depressions, are the result of random changes in 
the variables such as availability of profitable 
investment opportunities in the economy, the 
propensity to save, the macroeconomic policy 
framework, population, international terms of 
trade etc (Freeman & Perez, 1988). The 
competing view of business cycles has that  
 
 
 
fluctuations would occur even if fundamental 
conditions to remain unaltered over time. This 
view has two variants.  
 
The first sees the fluctuations, the booms and 
busts, as created by internal factors resulting 
from the failure of the economic system to settle 
down to a stationary state even in the absence of 
shocks. This variant has been formalized as 
nonlinear systems exhibiting either periodic 
equilibria or chaos (Howitte and Macafee, 
1992). The second variant of the competing 
view attributes the fluctuations to random 
waves of optimism and pessimism that are 
unrelated to fundamental conditions.Arguing on 
behalf of this phenomenon, Keynes in his 
General Theory questionedthe role of business 
expectations or business confidence, or what 
Keynes called the 'animal spirits', in 
determining business cycles (Keynes, 1936). Of 
course, before him, his teacher in Cambridge, 
Arthur Pigou, has also remarked that it is "the 
varying expectations of business men... and 
nothing else constitute the immediate cause and 
direct causes or antecedents of industrial 
fluctuations" (Collard, 1996). 
 
However, with the onset of a period of "great 
moderation", unprecedented technological 
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change and globalization, in US and Europe 
during the final decade of twentieth century, the 
Keynesian explanation of business cycles fell 
out of grace with neo classical theories of 
market clearing and rational expectation 
embraced as the key elements in determining 
business cycles (Farmer and Guo, 1994). But, 
ironically, the ensuing crisis that gripped the US 
and Europe after 2008 turned the tables around. 
Again, there is a renewed emphasis on both 
economicfundamentals that causes cycles as 
well as other factors that affect cycles that do 
not have an elemental relation with economic 
fundamentals (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010). 
 
In the light of the above discussion, the primary 
objective of this research is to inquire into a 
facet of the relationship between animal spirits 
or sunspots and the economic fluctuations. The 
words “sunspots” or “animal spirits” are 
understood as self-fulfilling beliefs or waves of 
optimism and pessimism that are not related to 
economic fundamentals such as technology, 
preferences and endowments (Chauvet & Guo, 
2003).  In other words, the words "sunspots" or 
"animal spirits" usually refer to an exogenous 
random variable that does not directly affect 
economic fundamentals but affects the 
investment and business decisions of a business 
community. In short, it is an extrinsic 
uncertainty that does not come from variation in 
economic fundamentals but affects the mood of 
the investors (Cass & Shell, 1983).  
 
There is only a very limited amount of 
empirical research done to test the validity of 
the hypothesis that consumers’ sunspots and 
investors’ animal spirits have important 
independent influence on aggregate 
fluctuations. A notable exception is the research 
by Chauvet & Guo (2003) who find that the 
innovations to consumer sentiment and business 
formation continue to show the same observed 
cyclical patterns around turning points. One 
reason for this is the difficulty of the sunspot 
variable used by agents to coordinate their 
beliefs. Therefore, real world empirical 
evidence for expectationally driven randomness 
at work is scarce. Consequently, in order to 
achieve the primary objective of this research, 
the researcher works out an experiment to 
attempt to answer this question regarding the 
relationship between business cycles and 
sunspots or animal spirits. 
 
Experiments are a special form of games and 
everyone play games for the fun of it. Games 
are also adaptive and serve to help us learn. An 
experiment actively engages some small piece 
of the world. A researcher designs and run an 
experiment and records the results in order to 
learn about a particular phenomenon. This form 
of learning is the essence of science (Cassar and 
Friedman, 2004).Experimental economics is 
relatively a young tradition in economics. For 
instance, economics theory before 1960s hardly 
had any room for laboratory experiments. 
Macroeconomics referred to exorbitantly large 
scale events, and seldom had connections with 
microeconomics. However, the microeconomics 
at that time referred primarily to equilibrium 
mainly under varying conditions of competition. 
Therefore, economics was chiefly interested in 
the consequences of assumptions that all agents 
(firms and households) are rational and they 
choose optimally to result in equilibrium prices 
that ensure consistency of choices (Friedman, 
1952). Till experimental economics emerged as 
a separate tradition shortly afterwards, no 
economists bothered to test the validity of these 
underlying assumptions.  
 
Meaningful economic experiments became 
possible with the emergence of new theories in 
the 1960s. Game theory, industrial organization, 
social choice theory and search theory, etc. 
offered competing ways to understand 
microeconomics data. And sometimes, multiple 
economic equilibria emerged from a single 
theory. By the early 1970s, many economists 
began to recognize the potential of experiments 
to distinguish among the many alternatives. 
Experimental economics really took off in the 
1980s. Financial markets, auctions, asymmetric 
information models, institutional engineering, 
voting, and dozens of other new applications 
opened to the new methodology. The 1990s saw 
continued rapid growth up to and until now that 
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is powered by the new computational 
techniques (Friedman and Cassar, 2004). 
 
However, it is of paramount importance to 
understand the rational for a separate tradition 
of experimental economics in contrast to 
traditional econometrics (Friedman and Cassar, 
2004). On one hand, traditional econometrics 
works with happenstance data, which occur 
naturally, as opposed to laboratory data, which 
are created in an artificial environment to 
inform the investigator. On the other hand, 
traditional econometrics works with 
uncontrolled processes, as opposed to the 
controlled process that are the hallmark of 
experimental science.  
 
Nowadays experimental methods are widely 
accepted by economists, but whether the data 
representative of the real world or not is a 
matter for the good laboratory technique and 
experiment design. The issue here is generally 
called external validity. It is a fundamental issue 
for any laboratory science. It goes back at least 
to Galileo and Newton, whose critics did not 
believe that the behaviour of balls on inclined 
planes had any relation to planetary motion. 
Formal models often omit crucial details 
regarding the complex reality, and sometimes 
include behavioral assumptions that the 
research would like to test rather than induce. 
Therefore, the contrast between the laboratory 
and "real world" is often exaggerated. 
Laboratory experiments feature real people 
operating under real rules for real states (Plott, 
cited in Friedman and Cassar 2004). They differ 
mainly in that they are simple than naturally 
occurring process. The real world is often too 
complex to approximate closely in the 
laboratory, and futile attempts to do so would 
decrease the scientific validity of the 
experiment.  
 
Keeping the above discussion in mind, the 
challenge is to design cycles that are 
expectationally driven and that occur if there 
are significant complementarities in some 
aspect of firms' decision making, creating an 
incentive for coordination. Thus, following the 
experimental economic methods pioneered in 
Marimon et al. (1993) who examined the role of 
animal spirits or sunspots in an experimental 
settings finding that sunspots can matter if they 
are expected to; the present research attempts to 
analyze the interrelationship between business 
cycles and animal spirits emphasizing the role 
of expectations and coordination on causing the 
same. A particularly simple model of this kind 
was proposed by Howitt and Mcafee (1992). 
Using this model, Hwang (2004) conducted a 
pilot session with pairs of individuals that 
validate the model. However, a major limitation 
of the above study was the use of pairs that 
made it easier for coordination.  
 
Therefore, this research proposes an experiment 
that captures the relevant features of Howitt and 
McAfee's theoretical environment with larger 
groups and investigates whether expectationally 
driven cycles occur in an experimental setting. 
In doing so, the remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section II describes the 
model and section III the experimental design. 
Section IV presents the experimental results and 
section V concludes with areas for further 
research. 
 
Model 
The following simple setup conveys the main 
idea behind Howeitt and McAfee's model. 
There is a continuum of identical, infinitely 
lived firms who decide whether to hire each 
period. A firm's decision is denoted by , 
which takes on the value 1 if the firm hires and 
0 if it does not. Letting  represent the 
proportion of firms who decide to hire, a firm's 
profits are given by 
 
  If:   Ht=1, Ht=0 
Where f ( ) is the firm's revenue. Crucially, 
the model assumes that > 0 so that each 
firm's hiring decisions carry externalities for 
other firms.It is clear that this setup must 
generate multiple equilibria. Since, with 
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appropriate conditions on costs, all the firms 
will find it optimal to coordinate their actions 
by either hiring together or not hiring. 
Assuming that costs can be either high, , or 
low, , and these costs are observed after 
firms have made their hiring decisions, the 
sufficient condition for coordination is: 
f(0)  < < f < < f (1) 
Whichsays that when no firm is hiring, the 
revenue from hiring will never justify the cost, 
while if every other firm is hiring, then the 
remaining firm will also want to hire, since the 
benefits from externalities are large enough to 
swamp even high costs.  
 
At this point, before, turning to cycles, it is 
useful to establish some benchmark results 
under the assumption of deterministic costs; that 
is, costs are either always high or always low. 
These assumptions are based on the fact that 
since firms make hiring decisions repeatedly, 
observing costs after they decide each period, it 
follows that they will learn to base their 
decisions on their increasingly confident-and 
correct- forecast of costs for the next period. 
Two possible equilibria in the case of 
deterministic costs are the "optimistic" and 
"pessimistic" paths in which all firms choose 
either to hire or not.  
 
Assuming instead that costs are stochastic 
yields the main result of the model. To consider 
the possibility of animal-spirits equilibria, 
assume that in addition to randomly shifting 
costs, there is a random variable, extrinsic to the 
economy, which changes between two states, 
high and low, and is observed before firms 
make hiring decisions. Under these 
assumptions, optimistic and pessimistic paths 
remain as possible equilibria, along with a third 
possibility: a cycle where all firms hire if 
animal spirits, the extrinsic random variable, are 
high and not hire if spirits are low. Howitt and 
McAfee (1992) show that such an animal spirits 
cycle can be rational-expectations equilibrium if 
agents update their beliefs regarding relevant 
probabilities according to Bayesian learning.  
 
The intuition for this is straightforward. 
Suppose that firms experience a period of 
spurious correlation between spirits and costs. 
During this period, firms will learn to base their 
decisions on the publicly observed animal 
spirits or sunspots, which turn out, temporarily, 
to be a perfect forecast of costs. Eventually, the 
correlation disappears and spirits can no longer 
be used to forecast costs but firms will have 
learned that they are made better off by 
coordinating, regardless of whether costs are 
high or low, due to output externalities. If this 
incentive for coordination induces some firms 
to use animal spirit or sunspots as a device for 
coordination, then the externalities reinforce 
theirbehaviour, eventually producing a cyclical 
equilibrium.  
 
Experimental Design 
The model contains four crucial features that an 
experiment testing its predictions must capture 
in some way:1) the presence of externalities, 2) 
uncertainty regarding costs, 3) an extrinsic 
random variable, and 4) the timing of events. 
The research presents a variant on a two-player 
coordination game which is likely the simplest 
setup with these features. 
 
Consider a four player game with the following 
payoff matrices: 
  
 
 
 Hiring    Not                  Hiring        Not  
Hiring 10,     0, 0 Hiring           Hiring  1, 1  0, 0       Hiring 
Not 0, 0    6, 6 Not             Not  0, 0  5, 5       Not 
 Hiring    Not                     Hiring     Not 
 Low Cost    High Cost 
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Each player chooses hiring or not hiring without 
observing a random event that determines the 
payoffs as shown above. The researcher has 
chosen to make presentation of the game to the 
subjects context-free and therefore uses neutral 
labels in place of hiring and not hiring as A and 
B. Here choice of hiring can be thought as A, 
not hiring as B, and low cost as a random event 
X and high costs as random event Y. Note that 
the pure strategy equilibria of the game require 
coordination, with the exact payoffs depending 
on which random event has occurred. This 
introduces the first two required elements of the 
model into the experiment: externalities and 
uncertainty. As in the model where a firm 
would like to follow the actions of the others, 
here a player would like to make the same 
choice as the other player. Also following the 
model, coordination is always better than not 
coordinating but whether coordination on A or 
B is more profitable depends on an unobserved 
random event. 
 
The researcher introduces animal spirits by 
showing at the beginning of each round either 
one of two pictures, one depicting a sunrise and 
another depicting a storm. Below in Table 1 the 
pictures are referred to as "Optimistic" and 
"pessimistic" respectively. The previous section 
noted that Bayesian learning is consistent with 
the animal spirits equilibrium if there is a period 
of spurious correlation between spirits and 
costs, during which firms learn that no matter 
what the costs are coordination will always be 
profitable. The researcher introduces a 
"spurious" correlation by correlating the 
pictures perfectly with the random events 
during the first ten round of the game. For the 
remaining twenty rounds, the realizations of 
pictures and random events are determined 
independently by separate coin tosses done 
prior to the experiment. Also the process of 
learning described in the model presumes that 
firms do not have ex ante knowledge that 
coordinating with other firms will make them 
better off-this must be "learned" during the 
period of spurious correlation. Therefore, I 
choose not to reveal the payoff matrix to the 
subjects, in contrast to the standard approach in 
coordination experiments where payoffs are 
typically known in advance. 
 
All subjects observe sunspotsSubjects make 
choice A or B (representing to hire or not) and 
hands over the paper to researcherThe 
researcher gives feedback on realized random 
event, partners' choices and payoff for the round 
and had over the paper back for the next round. 
 
Picture 1 Timeline for each round 
Figure 1 shows the timeline for a single round 
of the experiment. At the beginning, either an 
optimistic or pessimistic picture is shown. The 
subjects are then asked to write down their 
choice of A or B. The experimenter then 
collects the record sheets and fills in the 
following information as feedback: the partners' 
choices, the realization of the random event and 
the profit the subject made. The feedback gives 
the subject a chance to learn, and use to their 
advantage, the correlation between pictures and 
random events in the first ten rounds. Further, if 
learning takes place as the model describes, 
then the first ten rounds should also teach the 
subjects that coordination makes them better off 
and lead, at least in some pairs, to animal-spirits 
cycles. Twenty Engineering undergraduate 
students at the South Eastern University of Sri 
Lanka were recruited as subjects for this 
economics experiment. See the Appendix 1 for 
the instructions. 
 
Results 
Table 1 reports the data from the last twenty 
rounds of the experiment. The researcher 
focuses on them since the research is mainly 
interested in behavior observed sufficiently 
after the initial period of correlation so that the 
subjects have had a chance to reach any 
equilibrium. The first two columns show the 
realizations of pictures and random events. The 
remaining columns show the choices made by 
each subject. The subjects' labels indicate the 
groups. The second row from the bottom 
records the number of time changes in a 
subject's choices coincided with changes in the 
pictures in a consistent manner. The last row 
indicates the type of equilibrium reached. 
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The second group (S2-1, S2-2, S2-3, and S2-4) 
clearly appears to have reached an animal 
spirits cycle. All the subjects choose A when 
the picture is bright and B when the picture is 
dark for the entire duration of the last twenty 
rounds with only one deviation by the third 
participant (S2-3) at only the beginning of final 
rounds. The fourth group (S4-1, S4-2, S4-3, and 
S4-4) appears to be converging on to the same 
animal spirits equilibrium. All the participants 
in the group switched their choices with the 
picture at least fifteen out of twenty times. And 
the third participant did so sixteen out of twenty 
times. The last group too appears to exhibit 
somewhat similar pattern at the beginning of 
their last rounds. Had the game been played a 
little longer, it seems likely that the fourth 
group would also have converged to perfect 
animal spirits equilibrium. 
Having settled to an animal spirits equilibrium 
during the first half of their final rounds, 
deviating from it only once in the beginning in 
eleventh round, and by third participant in the 
fourteenth round, they suddenly start deviating 
from the equilibrium animal spirits cycle in the 
twentieth round and emerge to be converging 
on a "reverse" animal spirits equilibrium where 
the participants choose A when the picture is 
dark and B when bright. There is consistent 
evidence for this during the last six rounds. 
 
The remaining two groups behave very 
differently from the three already discussed. 
The participants of the first group behave the 
more puzzling of the two as there appear to be 
some erratic behaviour by one member or the 
other in majority of rounds. The evidence to the 
possibility that they are converging to”reverse" 
animal spirit equilibrium is also quite weak; the 
participants only converge to this strategy four 
times in the last ten rounds. The third group 
appears equally puzzling, with the first 
participant choosing A for the entire duration 
and the third participant choosing B for the 
same duration in Table 1. This virtually 
eliminates the possibility of any equilibrium. 
However, the model may yield both optimistic 
and pessimistic paths as valid equilibria under 
stochastic costs. But due to the diametrically 
opposite choices of the above participants, there 
is no room for such equilibria either. 
 
So far, inspection of individual behaviour 
indicates that animal spirits cycles may arise. It 
is also instructive however to look at the entire 
pool of subjects. Figure 2 shows for each round 
the number of groups that succeeded in 
coordinating.  
 
At the outset, the pictures are not correlated 
with random events. But, the frequency 
coordination rises as participants "learn" that 
pictures can be utilized to guess random events. 
Therefore, the subjects learn through the 
feedback of the profits and realized random 
events that they may use the pictures to forecast 
random events and at the same time that 
coordination is profitable. In the eleventh round, 
pictures are no longer correlated with random 
events and the frequency of coordination drops. 
But it increases again, with at least three of the 
five groups coordinating in the ten out of twelve 
rounds. This is indicative of the type of learning 
the model describes. Once the initial period of 
correlation ends, the subjects use the pictures no 
longer as a forecast for random events but now 
as a coordination device since they discover that 
regardless of the costs, coordination increases 
profits. This naturally explains the finding that 
some type of coordination equilibrium was 
reached for three of the five groups by the end 
of the experiment.  
 
Conclusion 
Thus, the results the researcher reported above 
corroborate the finding that some type of 
conditioning can induce agents to base 
decisions on extrinsic random events. They also 
support the theoretical result that, with right 
incentive for coordination, animal spirits cycles 
arise with positive probability. The results are 
also consistent with Bayesian learning, which 
show to be able to generate beliefs that 
converge to animal spirits cycle equilibrium 
(Howitt and McAfee, 1993). 
The results presented here are preliminary but 
provide initial support for the empirical validly 
of Howitt and McAfee's model of animal spirits 
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cycles. Further, they corroborate the finding that 
a period of correlation between a sunspot and a 
fundamental of an economy can condition 
agents into basing their future decisions on the 
sunspot even in the absence of any correlation 
(Marimon et al, 1992). In addition, the findings 
strengthen the hypothesis that given the right 
incentives for coordination, expectations-driven 
cycles do occur (Hwang, 2004).  
 
Future work can build on the simple 
experimental design used in this research paper 
in several directions.In order to bring out the 
importance of initial correlation and stochastic 
costs more clearly, a more formal 2x2 design 
may be used, with the nature of costs (fixed or 
stochastic) and correlation (with and without) as 
treatment variables. Rematching of subjects and 
expanding feedback to include the concurrent 
behaviour of other groups may also be 
considered. 
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Appendix 
General Instruction to participants 
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18 D X A B B B B B B B A A B B B B B B B B B B 
19 B X A B A A A A A A A B B B A A A A A A A A 
20 B X A A A A A A A A A B B A A A B A A A A A 
21 B Y A A A A A A A A A A B A A A A A A A A A 
22 D X B A B B B B B B A B B B B B B B A A A A 
23 B Y B B A A A A A A A A B A B B A A B B A A 
24 B Y B B B A A A A A A A B A B B B A B B B B 
25 B Y B B B B A A A A A B B B B B B B B B B B 
26 D Y A A A A B B B B A A B A A A A A A A A A 
27 B Y B A B B A A A A A B B B B B B B A A A A 
28 B X B B B B A A A A A B B B A A A A B B B B 
29 D X A A A A B B B B A A B A B B B B A A B A 
30 B Y B B B A A A A A A B B B A A A A A A A B 
Switched with 
A.S 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
2
0 
2
0 
1
9 
2
0 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
1
5 
1
5 
1
5 
1
6 
1
2 
1
3 
1
3 
1
2 
 
 
Type of 
Equilibrium 
NA ASC NA ASC ASC 
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Figure 2 Frequency of coordination.
You are about to participate in an economic experiment in which you will play a game with 3unknown 
participant for 30 rounds. 
In each round, you have to choose A or B. The other participants will also choose A or B. Your profit 
for that round depends on three things: 
1. Your choice 
2. The other participants choices 
3. A random event 
 
The following table shows how your profits are calculated 
 
Table -01 
Your choice Other  
Participant's  
Choice 
Other 
Participant's 
choice 
Other 
Participant's 
choice 
Your profit 
A A A A k 
A A A B l 
A A B B m 
A B B B n 
B B B B o 
B B B A p 
B B A A q 
B A A A r 
A A A A s 
A A A B t 
A A B B u 
A B B B v 
B B B B w 
B B B A x 
B B A A y 
B A A A z 
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Each round, either one of two random events 
occurs: X or Y. If random event X occurs, for 
instance, and you choose A and the other 
three participants B, then you will get n 
number of points. If random event Y occurs 
and both you and the other participant choose 
B, then you will receive w points for that 
round.Some combinations of choices by you 
and the other participants will yield more 
profits than other choices, although you will 
not know in advance which choices are more 
profitable. 
 
Finally, for each round before you make your 
choice, the researcher will show one of the 
following two pictures: 
 
Picture 1 
 
 
These pictures may or may not be related to or 
be relevant in the game. You may choose to 
ignore these pictures or to use them in some 
way.  
 
Filling the sheet 
On the record sheet, please fill out the first 
two columns each round.  
 In the first column, "Pictures," write in 
whether picture 1 or picture 2 is 
shown. 
 In the second column, "your choice", 
write your choice for that round: A or 
B. 
 
Do not fill out the rest of the form. When you 
have filled out the first two columns, the 
researcher will take the sheet and fill out the 
other participant's choice, the random event 
and your profit for the round. 
 
Remember that your profits depend only on 
three things: your choice, the other 
participant's choices, and the random event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             Picture 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
